This paper measures the growth in open market stock repurchases and the manner in which stock repurchases and dividends are used by U.S. corporations. Stock repurchases and dividends are used at di!erent times from one another, by di!erent kinds of "rms. Stock repurchases are very pro-cyclical, while dividends increase steadily over time. Dividends are paid by "rms with higher`permanenta operating cash #ows, while repurchases are used by "rms with higher`temporarya, non-operating cash #ows. Repurchasing "rms also have much more volatile cash #ows and distributions. Finally, "rms repurchase stock following poor stock market performance and increase dividends following good performance. These results are consistent with the view that the #exibility inherent in repurchase programs is one reason why they are sometimes used instead of dividends.
Introduction
One of the most signi"cant trends in corporate "nance during the 1990s is the increasing popularity of open market stock repurchase programs. Between 1985 and , the number of open market repurchase program announcements by U.S. industrial "rms has increased 650% from 115 to 755, and their announced value has increased 750% from $15.4 billion to $113 billion. Correspondingly, dividends have only risen by a factor of just over two during the same period; aggregate dividends for all industrial "rms listed on Compustat have risen from $67.6 billion to $141.7 billion. Repurchases are clearly an increasingly important method of paying out cash to shareholders.
In this paper, we examine "rms' decisions to distribute cash #ows and their choices between paying out cash #ows in the form of dividends or stock repurchases. Our goal is to assess the increasing importance of repurchases in payout decisions and to isolate factors that a!ect the choice between repurchases and dividends. Out primary hypothesis is that dividends represent an ongoing commitment and are used to distribute permanent cash #ows, while repurchases are used to pay out cash #ows that are potentially temporary. Repurchases thus preserve "nancial #exibility relative to dividends because they do not implicitly commit the "rm to future payouts.
At least since Lintner (1956) , "rms have been reluctant to cut dividends and have been greeted by a signi"cantly negative stock market reaction when they do; Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) and Denis et al. (1994) report an average stock price decline of about 6% on the three days surrounding the announcement of a dividend cut. Repurchases, on the other hand, involve no such commitment or risk. Firms sometimes announce programs but fail to repurchase any shares. Even if a "rm completes a program, it is under no explicit or even implicit obligation to begin another new repurchase program. Given these market expectations, stock repurchases would be a sensible way for "rms to pay out cash #ows that have a high likelihood of not being sustainable.
In Section 2 of the paper, we discuss the construction of a database of repurchase announcements and actual share repurchases for all U.S. public "rms for the period 1985 to 1996. We begin with an initial sample of all repurchases programs announced from 1985 through 1996, as reported by Securities Data Company (SDC). Since it is not always possible to determine with publicly available information exactly how many shares a particular "rm purchased in a given year, we construct estimates of the upper and lower bounds of the number of shares repurchased by each of these "rms that are listed on both Standard and Poor's Compustat database and the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) tapes. We use these estimates to calculate estimates of total payouts and the division of these payouts between dividends and stock repurchases.
In Section 3, we provide estimates of aggregate repurchases, as well as the aggregate value of other forms of payouts. We do so both to test the aggregate form of the #exibility hypothesis that repurchases are more pro-cyclical than dividends and because our estimates of repurchases are improvements on those in the literature. At an economy-wide level, we "nd that actual share repurchases have increased over our sample period and represent an economically important source of payouts. Over the period 1985 to 1996, aggregate actual share repurchases by industrial "rms total between $249 billion and $339 billion. This corresponds to 53 to 72% of announced repurchase levels and 20 to 27% of aggregate dividends.
In contrast to dividends, which grow smoothly, aggregate share repurchases are volatile and vary considerably with the business cycle. Firms increase their repurchases disproportionately relative to dividends during boom times and reduce them more during recessions. Even though dividends continue to make up the majority of total payouts, repurchases are responsible for much of the year-to-year variation. Overall, repurchases have not replaced dividends as the primary payout vehicle. Even in 1996, which was the largest year for repurchases in this sample, dividends amounted to more than double the total actual share repurchases and 126% of the total announced share repurchases. Firms are still generally increasing dividends every year; the fact that they are doing so and not increasing repurchases even faster suggests that there still is a dividend puzzle.
Section 4 of the paper considers the cross-sectional determinants of payout policy. We "rst reexamine Lintner's (1956) famous arguments. Lintner's premise is that managers prefer to increase dividends regularly and avoid decreasing dividends if possible. These arguments predict that dividend increases will be made by "rms with higher and more stable cash #ows, that dividend increases will be related to permanent but not necessarily to temporary components of cash #ow, and that dividend decreases will be less frequent than increases and accompanied by very poor performance. We test these predictions empirically and "nd them supported by the data. Our evidence is also consistent with the recent empirical work on the relation between dividend changes and future earnings (see Bernartzi et al., 1997; DeAngelo et al., 1996) . Although dividends appear to be paid out of permanent earnings, we "nd little evidence of subsequent earnings improvements following dividend increases.
We then test the "nancial #exibility hypothesis cross-sectionally. In particular, we expect to observe "rms choosing repurchases rather than dividends when the value of "nancial #exibility is highest; i.e. when there is a high likelihood that Guay and Harford (2000) report similar conclusions using a di!erent empirical approach.
See, for example, Hulbert (1997) . Putting their money where their mouths are, Forbes, April 21, 1997.
Although "rms are not required to announce share repurchases, the announcement of a "rm's intent to repurchase shares on the open market (or through privately negotiated transactions) is one of the safe harbor provisions under the stock price manipulation provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act. Additionally, a "rm must satisfy the four criteria detailed in S.E.C. rule 10b-18 of the Securities and Exchange Commission's antimanipulation guidelines. These four criteria are: (1) on any one day, "rms may not purchase more than 25% of the average daily volume of their own shares during the prior four weeks, block trades and privately negotiated transactions are exempt from this guideline; (2) "rms may not purchase their own shares at the open, or during the last one-half hour of trading; (3) "rms may not purchase their own shares at a price higher than the last independent bid, or the last reported sale price; and (4) all purchases on a single day must be executed through the same brokerage "rm. This rule was adopted in 1982 and caused an increase in the number of open market repurchase programs adopted due to the resolution of the legal ambiguity (see Ikenberry et al., 1995) .
In terms of observable costs, dividend increases may also appear to be essentially costless; however, a dividend increase provides an explicit commitment to increase current payouts and an implicit commitment to keep future payouts at this increased level. An open market repurchase announcement provides no such commitments and there is no evidence of a reputational penalty for those "rms failing to follow through with their announced repurchase program. the cash #ows being paid out are temporary. We construct empirical measures of whether cash #ow is more or less likely to be temporary, and use these measures to predict whether a payout-increasing "rm is more or less likely to increase dividends, repurchases, or both in any given year. Such temporary cash #ows are likely to occur when a "rm's cash #ows are made up of a higher proportion of non-operating income relative to operating income, when a "rm's earnings volatility prior to the repurchase is high, and when the "rm's future cash #ows are expected to decrease. In our data, each of these measures increases the likelihood of a "rm using repurchases rather than dividends as a means of distributing cash #ows. These "ndings suggest that managers tend to use dividends to pay out permanent cash #ows and repurchases to pay out temporary cash #ows.
Measuring share repurchases
Although open market stock repurchases are increasingly common and have recently received much publicity, they are surprisingly di$cult to measure. A "rm can legally repurchase its own stock whenever it chooses without announcing its intention to do so; however, by announcing a repurchase program the "rm protects itself from liability under the stock price antimanipulation provision of the Securities and Exchange Act. Since announcing a repurchase program is essentially costless to the "rm, making such an announcement would appear to be the dominant strategy for "rms that are planning to repurchase stock. There is little evidence of "rms repurchasing In recent years it has become common for "rms to disclose the number of shares repurchased on their 10-Ks and 10-Qs. In 1995 approximately 75% of a random sample of "rms announcing open market repurchase programs made such disclosures. However, this appears to be a relatively recent phenomena; prior to 1992 very few "rms disclosed any details of their repurchasing activities and almost none of the "rms reported the number of shares repurchased on their 10-Ks or 10-Qs. SDC now includes actual share repurchases in their database back through 1994, but this is not the "gure generally reported in the popular press. their own stock without having an announced program in place. Announcements are generally made to the various wire services, which are then collected in the Securities Data Company (SDC) database and are often reported in The Wall Street Journal and other business publications. SDC releases the aggregate dollar value of the repurchase announcements in its database to non-subscribers, and this number is often quoted as a measure of total stock repurchases (see Hulbert (1997) ; Hylton (1995); Power 1995) ).
In fact, there are a number of reasons why the total released by SDC does not accurately measure actual stock repurchases. First and foremost, the announcements are simply a statement of the "rm's intention to repurchase its stock; the "rm is in no way obligated to do so. While the majority of "rms follow through with their announced open market repurchase programs, a signi"cant number of "rms repurchase few or no shares. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) document that while most "rms repurchase at least the number of shares originally announced over the subsequent three years and frequently repurchase more shares than originally announced, a signi"cant number of "rms repurchase very few or no shares. Generally, those "rms repurchasing more shares than originally announced initiate subsequent repurchase programs or announce expansions of their existing programs, so it is reasonable to think of the announced value as an upper bound on the amount the "rm will repurchase in a particular program.
Second, the aggregate dollar value of announced repurchase programs reported by SDC overstates the total value of the announced repurchase programs due to the way that the SDC constructs this "gure. SDC includes announcements from a variety of sources, including wire services and The Wall Street Journal, so repurchase programs that are announced in more than one of the sources on di!erent days are included multiple times by SDC. In addition, SDC includes announcements of withdrawn programs and privately negotiated repurchases into its "gure. The privately negotiated repurchases are generally announced after the transaction has taken place and do not usually re#ect any intention to repurchase additional shares.
Since share repurchases in the open market are neither observable at the time of the transaction nor are they always directly measurable subsequently, it is impossible to know with publicly available information exactly how many If the "rm holds the shares as Treasury stock or retires the shares, then the value reported by the Compustat aggregation is an accurate re#ection of the cost of acquiring the shares. However, if the shares are subsequently distributed to employee bene"t plans, used for the exercise of stock options or reissued then this aggregation will also capture any change in market value since the time of the initial repurchase.
shares were repurchased for all "rms. Since 1984, "rms have been required to report the value of their repurchases on their Statement of Cash Flows and this item is included in the Compustat database as`Purchases of Common and Preferred Stocka (data item C115). However, this variable is an aggregation of many other types of transactions and overstates actual share repurchases, sometimes substantially. This aggregation includes conversions of other classes of stock into common stock, purchases of Treasury stock, retirements of common or preferred stock, and redemptions of redeemable preferred stock. The purchases of Treasury stock also include privately negotiated repurchases and self-tender o!ers in addition to open market repurchases. The privately negotiated transactions are often considerable; during our sample period there are $53.2 billion in privately negotiated repurchases. Additionally, this aggregation will in some instances misrepresent the cost of a repurchase. The combined overstatement of repurchases as reported to Compustat is potentially signi"cant.
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) suggest an alternative method of measuring share repurchases, using the monthly decreases in shares outstanding as reported by CRSP adjusted for non-repurchase activity a!ecting shares outstanding such as stock splits and dividend reinvestment plans. Monthly decreases in shares outstanding are not o!set with subsequent increases in shares outstanding since it is possible, even when a "rm is actively repurchasing shares, for shares outstanding to increase as the result of exercise of executive stock options, distribution of Treasury shares to employee bene"t plans or even contemporaneous stock issues. We improve on the Stephens and Weisbach (1998) CRSP measure of share repurchases by adjusting for new stock issues; 22 of the "rms in our sample issue new seasoned equity while having an active open market repurchase program in place. It is not always possible, however, to determine how many shares were reissued to employee bene"t plans or through the exercise of executive stock options. Hence, this measure will underestimate of share repurchases by the amount of shares contemporaneously reissued. In addition, programs are included into this category multiple times if the program is reported in more than one source. There are a total of 93 repeat announcements and 34 withdrawn programs included in the SDC database, which are excluded from our statistical analysis. SDC's policy is to release only the total number and value from this category in their database to nonsubscribers, which has resulted in somewhat larger values reported in the press than are reported here.
Estimates of aggregate repurchases and payouts

Repurchase announcements
SDC started collecting repurchase announcements in 1985, so there is not a comprehensive listing of program announcements prior to 1985. However, it does appear that both the number and value of programs was substantially smaller prior to this point. For example, Vermaelen (1981) "nds that only 198 NYSE "rms initiated open market repurchase programs between 1970 and 1978. Grinblatt and Titman (1998) The relative popularity of other types of programs has also shifted over time. In the late 1980s, self-tender o!ers and Dutch auctions were relatively popular since many were used as takeover defenses. Another reason for the prevalence of self-tender o!ers was the leveraged recapitalizations common during this period. The largest years for self-tender o!ers, in value terms, were 1985 and 1988. Two cases led directly to such a large "gure for 1985, Unocal's $4.2 billion repurchase and Union Carbide's $3.3 billion repurchase; Allegis' repurchase $2.8 billion was the largest repurchase in 1988. In the 1990s, there have been more privately negotiated transactions, with their values rising substantially in 1995 and 1996.
Values of repurchases
We present estimates of the dollar values of actual repurchases in Columns 5 through 9 of Table 1. As discussed above, it is not always possible to know from This "nding contradicts the conclusions of Netter and Mitchell (1989) . One potential explanation for the di!erence in "ndings is that Netter and Mitchell use just the change in the number of shares during the year as their measure of repurchases, while we use the month-to-month change. This approach understates repurchases if there is any redistributions of shares during the year, while ours understates it only if shares are redistributed in the same month (or quarter, if the "rm only reports its outstanding shares quarterly).
publicly available data exactly how many shares a "rm repurchased in a given year. We present the CRSP repurchase measure suggested by Stephens and Weisbach (1998) with an adjustment for secondary equity o!erings occurring during the program in Column 5. This measure provides a lower bound on the value of the repurchases. The total of $258 billion of repurchases is approximately 55% of the total announced value of $471 billion. This value understates the ultimate quantity of repurchases from these programs because it does not include all of the repurchases from programs begun at the end of the sample period. Since the two largest years for repurchase announcements were 1995 and 1996, together making up more than 35% of the value of all announcements, the total completion rate is likely to be similar to the 70 to 80% completion rates found by Stephens and Weisbach (1998) .
The estimates of aggregate actual share repurchases in Column 5 of Table  1 suggest that repurchases vary substantially over time. The "rst few years of the sample appear to contain relatively few repurchases. However, we do not have data on program announcements prior to 1985, so the estimate for 1985 is likely to be particularly low since it only re#ects repurchases from programs begun during that year. The post-crash announcements of 1987 led to a large number of repurchases in 1988, 1989, and 1990 . Repurchases slowed noticeably in the early 1990s and increased substantially in the mid-1990s. The numbers in Column 5 measure aggregate repurchases for all programs from "rms on the CRSP tape. We are interested in relating these "gures to other variables taken from Compustat; therefore, we present the CRSP measure for the subset of "rms that are also on Compustat in Column 6 of Table 1 . These numbers are similar, although slightly smaller, than those for the entire CRSP sample.
While the CRSP measure understates repurchases, the "gure reported on Compustat overstates them because it includes a number of other items in addition to repurchases. We present Compustat's aggregate number in Column 7 of Table 1 . This "gure is considerably larger than the CRSP measure presented in Column 6. We adjust the Compustat number in two ways to measure actual repurchases more accurately. First, since the Compustat "gure includes Dutch auctions, privately negotiated deals, and self-tender o!ers, we subtract them from the total and present the results in Column 8 of Table 1 . Second, we restrict our calculations to include only "rms that we know are actively repurchasing stock. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) "nd that most "rms repurchase all of the stock they ultimately will during the two years subsequent to the initiation of a program. Consequently, we de"ne a "rm-year as having an active program as one in which a program is announced during that calendar year or one of the two previous years. We present the aggregate repurchase measure for "rms with active programs de"ned this way in Column 9 of Table 1 .
The estimates in Column 9, representing the Compustat repurchase measure for "rms with active programs, are larger but of the same order of magnitude as the CRSP measure for the same group of "rms presented in Column 6. This "nding is not surprising given that the Compustat measure overstates repurchases while the CRSP measure understates it. A potentially troubling issue is that the aggregate Compustat repurchase measure is so much larger than the measure restricted to "rms with active programs; the total di!erence between the two columns is around $240 billion even after adjusting for Dutch auctions and self-tender o!ers. This di!erence could simply be due to the fact that the Compustat variable includes other components in addition to the repurchase variable. Alternatively, it could occur because a substantial number of "rms repurchase stock without an announced repurchase program or repurchase program announcements are missing in the SDC database. We do not wish to dismiss this possibility, especially given that the incentive to announce a program for repurchasing comes from the safe harbor provisions of SEC Rule 10b-18 and that "rms with repurchase programs appear to violate other provisions of this act (see Cook et al., 1997a) .
Either of these possibilities implies that "rms are repurchasing stock without a repurchase program listed by SDC. If so, the CRSP measures of actual share repurchases that only considers "rms with such programs will understate aggregate repurchases. To gauge the extent of such understatement, we calculate the CRSP measure of repurchases based on drops in the number of shares outstanding for all "rm-years without active programs, but with positive repurchases reported by Compustat. The total aggregated over all years, which should re#ect the total value of privately negotiated repurchases, self-tender o!ers, Dutch auction repurchases, and unannounced open market repurchases during our sample period, is $82 billion. This "gure, which admittedly is an underestimate, is nonetheless substantially smaller than the sum total of the privately negotiated repurchases, self-tender o!ers, and Dutch auctions suggesting that the number of "rms repurchasing stock without a program listed on SDC is relatively small.
Another issue is which of the two measures, the CRSP measure from Column 6 or the Compustat-based measure from Column 9, more accurately re#ects actual repurchases. To compare the accuracy of these two measures we rely on survey data from Cook et al. (1997a,b) , who requested data on actual repurchases from all "rms starting programs in 1993 and received such data from 64 "rms. Of these 64 "rms, 35 had data on both CRSP and Compustat. We compare our measures of repurchases to each of the 64 "rm-years reporting positive repurchases in the Cook et al. data set. The median CRSP measure is We use medians rather than means because there appear to be a number of outliers that would make interpretation of averages di$cult. For example, there were seven cases in which "rms reported positive repurchases to Cook et al. (1997a,b) but reported zero on their "nancial statement for the variable that includes repurchases. There were two cases where the Stephens and Weisbach (1998) measure, which should understate repurchases, is greater than 500% of repurchases reported in the survey, which potentially means that the corporations only reported a fraction of their actual repurchases in their response to the request for data. 68% of the median dollar value reported in the Cook et al. data, while the median Compustat measure is 113% of that value. We interpret this "nding as supportive of our argument that the CRSP measure underestimates repurchases while Compustat overstates repurchases, and suggests that the Compustat measure adjusted for program announcements is likely to be more accurate. Table 2 that repurchases are growing rapidly, but that dividends remain the predominate payout device. In 1996, dividends still account for 65% of total payouts, compared to 69% in 1985. In 1985, dividends paid by industrial "rms listed on Compustat were between 8 and 13 times the value of actual share repurchases and 450% of the announced value of all share repurchase programs. At the end of the sample period dividends for industrial "rms remain between 2 and 3 times as large as actual repurchases, regardless of whether one uses the underestimate or the overestimate to calculate repurchases, and 125% of the dollar amount of announced share repurchases. While repurchases have not nearly replaced dividends, the value of share repurchases has increased much more dramatically than the value of dividends. Even though repurchases are growing rapidly, dividends are as well; dividends for Compustat industrial "rms grew almost 25% between 1992 and 1996 and have more than doubled over our entire sample period.
As has been recognized since at least Lintner (1956) , dividends have historically been characterized by relatively steady growth. This description appears to characterize our sample period as well. Aggregate dividends paid by industrial "rms listed on Compustat increased fairly steadily during our sample. Total payouts, however, were much more volatile than dividends. They dropped in a number of years, and, in fact, did not surpass 1988 levels until 1995. The source of this volatility is the other components of payouts, especially open market repurchases. At least at the aggregate level, repurchases appear to make up a disproportionately large share of the short-term #uctuations in payouts, while dividends represent a more permanent component.
Firm-level analysis of payouts
Hypothesis development
To complement this aggregate evidence, we now analyze the factors a!ecting payouts at the "rm level. Cross-sectional work on payout policy dates at least to Fama and Babiak (1968) , who "nd strong empirical support for the Lintner model of dividends during the period from 1946 to 1964. This section reexamines the Fama and Babiak results on a more recent sample. In addition, we empirically examine the factors that lead "rms to choose between dividends and repurchases, focusing on the #exibility arguments discussed above. Lintner (1956) argued that managers pay dividends out of long-run, sustainable earnings. A company with stable earnings would thus tend to pay out a higher dividend than an otherwise similar growth "rm. His interviews with managers indicated that they like to increase dividends regularly and view cutting dividends as extremely costly. They are therefore reluctant to make a dividend increase that will subsequently have to be reversed.
The Lintner model suggests a number of testable hypotheses regarding dividend behavior. Dividend-paying "rms should be larger than non-dividend paying "rms, and should have higher and more stable cash #ows. Dividend increases should be related to the permanent components of cash #ow, but not necessarily to the temporary components of cash #ows. Dividend decreases should be relatively rare and occur only when "rms have truly bad performance. Subsequent to dividend increases or decreases, the good or bad operating performance should continue.
There are a number of non-mutually exclusive factors that potentially in#u-ence "rms in their choice between dividends and stock repurchases. Two such factors, taxes and employee stock options, are e!ectively unobservable to us. Although the tax system treats dividends and repurchases the same at the corporate level, stock repurchases are generally tax-advantaged at the personal level. The magnitude of this tax advantage depends on the cost bases and marginal tax rates of the shareholders, which are not generally public information. However, it seems unlikely that taxes explain the more recent increase in repurchase activity, since the tax advantage of repurchases was substantially reduced in 1986, approximately corresponding to the beginning of the current repurchase wave. Fenn and Liang (1997) , Jolls (1998), and Weisbenner (1998) stress the importance of employee stock options in the decision to repurchase stock rather than An alternative would be a`specially designated dividenda, which is commonly thought of as an institution for paying out such cash #ows. DeAngelo et al. (2000) document that specially designated dividends historically have been much more`regulara than their name implies, suggesting that "rms historically used them to pay out recurring rather than unusual cash #ows. In addition, these authors "nd that most "rms replaced their specially designated dividends with regular dividends long before the current repurchase wave, suggesting that the repurchases studied here are not a replacement for such specially designated dividends. increase dividends. Employee stock options could in#uence payout decisions for two reasons. First, employee options create incentives for stock repurchases rather than dividends because the value of an option declines when a stock goes ex-dividend but not when a company repurchases shares. Second, Weisbenner (1998) emphasizes that managers prefer to use repurchased rather than newlyissued shares for employee options to avoid diluting earnings per share. However, directly controlling for the impact of executive options in our empirical work is infeasible given our sample size, since data on executive stock options are not available in machine-readable form. Nonetheless, the combination of these two option-induced reasons is undoubtedly an important factor in the current repurchase trend.
Perhaps the most commonly discussed motive for repurchases concerns asymmetric information. Dann (1981) , Vermaelen (1981) , and Ikenberry et al. (1995) suggest that stock prices rise on the announcement of a repurchase program. In addition, Comment and Jarrell (1991) "nd that the abnormal returns observed around the announcement of a repurchase program are inversely related to recent stock price performance leading up to the repurchase announcement. These results are consistent with the view that asymmetric information is an important motive for stock repurchases.
We, like Guay and Harford (2000) , focus on the impact of the cash #ow's permanence on the choice between dividends and repurchases. We hypothesize that dividends will be used to pay out cash #ows that are likely to be permanent, while stock repurchases will be used for cash #ows that are not likely to be able to be sustained inde"nitely.
This view leads to a number of testable predictions. First, when there is more uncertainty about future cash #ows, we expect the "rm to utilize repurchases to a greater extent. Second, since operating cash #ows tend to be more permanent than non-operating cash #ows, we expect a positive relation between operating income and dividends, while repurchases are more likely to be related to non-operating income. Third, if repurchases are more likely to re#ect temporary cash #ows, we hypothesize that dividend-increasing "rms will have larger subsequent cash #ows than repurchasing "rms. Finally, if "rms repurchase stock based on management's belief that the stock is undervalued, we would expect that "rms selecting repurchases would have lower stock returns prior to the payout change.
Variable construction
There are a number of variables that are likely to be related to the decision to pay out cash #ows. Using Compustat, we construct proxies of these variables for the periods before and after each potential payout increase. Our primary interest is the determinants and method of cash payouts. Consequently, our analysis focuses on cash #ow and its components: operating income, non-operating income, and capital expenditures. In order to reduce noise induced by year-toyear variations in many of the variables, we use three-year averages unless otherwise noted. Average values for years !3 through !1 relative to the payout change are used for variables prior to the payout change; average values for years 0 through #2 relative to the payout change are used for the variables subsequent to the payout change. The sample for our cross-sectional analysis is limited to the period from 1985 to 1994 to allow for measurement of subsequent cash #ows.
We use the book value of total assets (data item C6) in the year prior to the payout change (year !1) as our measure of "rm size. Operating income is the average ratio of operating income (data item C13) to total assets. Non-operating income is the average ratio of non-operating income (data item C61) to total assets. The standard deviation of operating income is the standard deviation of the ratio of operating income to total assets measured over the 5-year period from year !4 through 0. Capital expenditures is the average ratio of capital expenditures (data item C128) to total assets. The lagged dividend payout ratio is the prior year's ratio of total dividends (data item C21) to net income available to common shareholders (data item C237). The market-to-book ratio is the average ratio of the market value of equity, given by the year-end price per share (data item C24) multiplied by the number of shares outstanding (data item C25), to the book value of equity (data item C62). The debt ratio is the average ratio of long-term debt (data item C9) to total assets. Institutional ownership is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by institutions in the year prior to the payout change obtained from Compact Disclosure and is only available from 1991 through 1994. The increase in dividends divided by the market value of equity is the ratio of total dividends for the prior year minus total dividends for the current year to the market value of equity. The increase in repurchases divided by the market value of equity is the announced value of the open market repurchase program obtained from SDC to the market value of equity, given by the year end price per share (data item C24) multiplied by the number of shares outstanding (data item C25). Stock returns are computed from CRSP. Table 3 presents univariate statistics on the di!erences between "rms that choose di!erent payout methods. Column 1 provides statistics for the entire Table 3 Firm characteristics according to payout method This table provides means (medians in parentheses) of various "rm characteristics for the categories of possible payout combinations. Column 1 consists of all "rm-years listed on Standard and Poor's Compustat (Compustat) tapes from 1985 through 1994; utilities and "nancial "rms are excluded in all categories. Column 2 contains "rm-years with increased total payouts resulting from either increasing dividends, initiating a repurchase program, or both; the sample in column 2 is the union of the samples in columns 3, 4 and 5. Column 3 contains "rm-years with initiations or expansions of repurchase programs. Column 4 contains "rm-years with both repurchases and dividend increases. Column 5 contains "rm-years with dividend increases. Column 6 contains "rm-years with no change in current payout levels; the "rms must have positive payouts, but dividends have not changed. Column 7 contains "rm-years with no payouts (neither dividends nor stock repurchases) in either the current or prior year. Column 8 contains "rm-years with decreases in total payouts; the sample in column 8 is the union of the samples included in columns 9 and 10. Column 9 contains "rm-years with no repurchase announcement in the current year, but with a repurchase initiation or expansion in the prior year. Column 10 contains "rm-years with dividend decreases;
Univariate diwerences
there are 30 "rm-years with both dividend decreases and repurchase decreases (as de"ned for column 9) included in this column. Dividend increases and decreases are de"ned on a per share basis adjusted for stock splits and include only regular dividends as reported by CRSP.
All statistics are compiled from data obtained from Compustat unless otherwise stated; in order to reduce noise induced by year-to-year variations in many of the variables, we use three-year averages unless otherwise stated. Average values for years !3 through !1 relative to the payout change are used for variables prior to payout change; average values for years 0 through #2 relative to the payout change are used for the variables subsequent to the payout change. Firm size is total assets (data item C6) in the year prior to the payout change (year !1).
Operating income is the average ratio of operating income (data item C13) to total assets. Non-operating income is the average ratio of non-operating income (data item C61) to total assets. The standard deviation of operating income is the standard deviation of the ratio of operating income (data item C13) to total assets measured over the 5-year period from year !4 through 0. Capital expenditures is the average ratio of capital expenditures (data item C128) to total assets. The lagged dividend payout ratio is the prior year's ratio of total dividends (data item C21) to net income available to common shareholders (data item C237). The market-to-book ratio is the average ratio of the market value of equity, given by the year-end price per share (data item C24) multiplied by the number of shares outstanding (data item C25), to the book value of equity (data item C62). The debt ratio is the average ratio of long-term debt (data item C9) to total assets. Institutional ownership is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by institutions in the year prior to the payout change from Compact Disclosure. The prior year market returns are the CRSP monthly returns geometrically cumulated for the year prior (year !1)
to the year in question; current year market returns are the CRSP monthly returns cumulated for the current year (year 0). The increase in dividends/market value of equity is the ratio of total dividends for the prior year (year !1) minus total dividends for the current year (year 0) to the market value of equity. The increase in repurchases/market value of equity is the announced value of the open market repurchase program obtained from SDC to the market value of equity. sample, which consists of all "rm-years on Compustat from 1985 through 1994 excluding utilities and "nancial "rms. Column 2 presents the means and medians for "rm-years with increased total payouts. Columns 3, 4 and 5 break down the payout-increasing "rm-years: Column 3 includes observations with initiations or expansions of repurchase programs, Column 4 contains cases with dividend increases in addition to an initiation or expansion of a repurchase program, and Column 5 includes the "rm-years with dividend increases but no new repurchase program. Column 6 presents the means and medians for "rm-years with positive payouts that remain constant from the previous year, while Column 7 includes observations for "rm-years with no payouts (neither dividends nor stock repurchases) in either the current or prior year. Column 8 presents the means and medians for "rm-years with decreases in total payouts. Columns 9, and 10 break down these payout-decreasing observations: Column 9 contains observations with no repurchase announcement in the current year, but with a repurchase initiation or expansion in the prior year, while Column 10 presents the means and medians for "rm-years with dividend decreases. The 30 "rm-years in which both dividends and repurchases decrease are included with the dividend decreases in Column 10. Table 3 allows us to examine the empirical predictions of the Lintner model discussed above. The results are consistent with the predictions of this model. Firms making payouts are substantially larger than "rms that have not made payouts in the current or prior year. Dividend-increasing "rms have higher operating incomes and similar non-operating incomes than "rms that do not change payouts. Given that operating cash #ows are relatively permanent while non-operating incomes are more temporary, this "nding suggests that dividend increases are funded out of permanent cash #ows. The standard deviation of operating income, a proxy for the stability of cash #ows, is lower for the dividend-increasing "rms than for the "rms making no change to existing (but positive) payouts. The standard deviation of operating income for the "rms keeping current payouts constant is lower than the standard deviation of operating income for "rms that have not historically made any payouts. Subsequent to the payout change, dividend-increasing "rms continue to have substantially higher operating income than "rms that do not change payouts, which is in turn higher than subsequent operating income for "rms that have not historically paid dividends. These di!erences are signi"cant at the 1% level using two-tailed test of means and a Wilcoxon nonparametric test. All these results are consistent with the predictions of the Lintner model discussed above.
Dividend changes
This di!erence is potentially due to taxes: If low-tax investors purchase stocks of dividendpaying companies and high-tax investors purchase stocks of repurchasing companies, then stockholders of dividend-paying "rms will prefer "rms to increase dividends and stockholders of non-dividend paying "rms prefer to increase repurchases. Many thanks to a referee for suggesting this possibility.
Finally, the Lintner view suggests that "rms will avoid dividend decreases if at all possible, so that dividend decreases will be less frequent than increases and associated with genuinely poor performance. The data in Table 3 are consistent with this view. There were 1,280 cases in which the nominal dividend per share decreases; in comparison, there are 4,388 cases of dividend increases (723 of these observations also repurchase stock in the same year). However, the dividend decreases were much larger than the increases (4.3% of equity value compared to 0.76% of equity value). In these cases, the "rms are indeed in "nancial di$culty. During the year prior to dividend decreases, the average "rm paid out 43.53% of net income as dividends. The average operating income to assets was substantially lower for these "rms than for "rms keeping payouts constant or increasing them. Subsequent to the payout decrease, the average operating income over assets for these "rms decreases to 7.48%, just over a third of the average for dividend-increasing "rms. Table 3 also documents systematic di!erences between the dividend-increasing and repurchasing "rms. Dividend-increasing "rms are generally larger than repurchasing "rms. Prior to the payout increase, dividend-increasing "rms have higher operating cash #ows. However, consistent with the "nancial #exibility hypothesis, non-operating cash #ows are higher for repurchasing-increasing "rms than for dividend-increasing "rms. The standard deviation of the operating income for the repurchasing "rms is about twice as high as for the dividendincreasing "rms, suggesting that cash #ows for repurchasing "rms are substantially more uncertain than they are for dividend-increasing "rms.
The choice between stock repurchases and dividends
Perhaps the most striking number in Table 3 is the dividend payout ratio prior to the decision. The average dividend payout ratio for "rms that increased both dividends and repurchases is 39.6% and is 37.3% for "rms that increase only dividends. In comparison, the average lagged dividend payout for repurchasing "rms is only 15.8% and the median is zero. In fact, the median "rm increasing repurchases previously did not pay out any dividends at all. This large di!erence suggests that dividend-increasing "rms are following a historical policy of paying out cash #ows, while repurchases are less frequent events allowing "rms to pay out a cash surpluses that are likely to be temporary.
Subsequent to the payout increase, operating income is substantially and statistically signi"cantly higher for the dividend-increasing "rms than for the repurchase increasing "rms. Non-operating income continues to be higher for repurchasing "rms than for either of the other payout-increasing types, with both di!erences statistically signi"cant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with the view that repurchases are used to pay out temporary cash #ows while dividends are used to pay out permanent ones.
Another di!erence between repurchases and dividends concerns the size of the payouts. Firms increasing repurchases announce programs with announced targets equal to about 8% of equity value. Given that they typically buy about 75% of this target over the subsequent two or three years (see Stephens and Weisbach, 1998) , this value implies an increase in annual payouts of about 2% to 3% of equity value. In contrast, dividend increases are much more common but average only 0.76% of equity value. Repurchases allow "rms to distribute large quantities of cash to shareholders relatively quickly. Thus, the quantity of cash a "rm wants to distribute is likely to be an important factor in choosing between dividends and repurchases.
One of the common explanations of stock repurchases is that they occur when managers believe their stock is undervalued (see Dann, 1981; Vermaelen, 1981) . Consistent with this view is evidence that "rms tend to announce programs following poor stock market performance (see Comment and Jarrell, 1991; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998) . This result holds in our sample as well; the average stock return for "rms that announce repurchase programs but do not increase dividends during the year prior to the announcement is !1.1% and the median is !0.8%. In contrast, the average return for "rms announcing dividend increases but not a repurchase program is 25.9% and the median is 20.7%. This large di!erence is statistically signi"cant at the 1% level. Table 3 also presents the mean and median level of institutional ownership for each category. These observations are consistent with the view that institutions prefer established companies that have performed well recently. Firms that are increasing payouts have substantially higher institutional ownership than "rms keeping payouts constant or decreasing them. Among the payout-increasing "rms, the ones increasing repurchases but not dividends have the lowest levels of institutional ownership. One explanation of this "nding is that many institutions are tax-exempt, so that they do not share in the tax bene"ts of repurchases. Given this interpretation, this result is consistent with the arguments of Allen et al. (1998) , who suggest that one motive of dividend payments is to attract institutional investors that will subsequently provide monitoring bene"ts to the "rm.
Overall, the univariate comparisons in Table 3 suggest that dividend-increasing and repurchasing "rms are noticeably di!erent. Repurchasing "rms have more uncertain cash #ows and have not historically had high payout ratios. They have lower operating incomes but higher non-operating incomes. Firms tend to increase repurchases following poor stock-market performance while they tend to increase dividends following good performance. Finally, institutions tend to favor dividend-paying over repurchasing "rms. Weisbenner (1998) uses multinomial logit similarly to estimate the impact of stock option programs on the choice between repurchases and dividends.
Multivariate diwerences
The univariate comparisons suggest that there are di!erences between "rms' payouts depending on the "rms' characteristics. Since, these characteristics are correlated with one another we examine these di!erences in a multivariate context.
To do so, we estimate a model in which "rm characteristics predict payout policy. One complicating factor is that there are many potential choices of payout methods, roughly corresponding to the columns of Table 3. Given that these choices do not have a clear ordering, a natural approach to this problem is a multinomial logit model. The multinomial logit model assumes that the probability of an outcome > is given by:
and
Each H is a vector of dimension equal to the number of independent variables, which can be estimated by maximum likelihood. These estimates are conveniently expressed in terms of the log odds of any two outcomes, which equal:
The coe$cient on each independent variable in this equation equals the di!erence between the s for two di!erent outcomes. The p-value on such a coe$cient provides a test of the hypothesis that the independent variable a!ects the probability of each outcome in the same manner. Tables 4 and 5 provide estimates of a multinomial logit models predicting payout method choices. The di!erence between the two tables is that Table  5 includes institutional ownership as an independent variable, which limits the number of observations since our institutional ownership data is not available from Compact Disclosure before 1991. Each model reported here groups payout choices into four categories: increasing only repurchases, increasing only dividends, increasing both repurchases and dividends, or not increasing payouts. We limit the categories because we are primarily interested in the choice between dividends and repurchases. Adding more outcome types complicates both the estimation and the reporting of our results, since each additional choice requires one extra parameter per choice per independent variable. To ensure that limiting the model in this fashion does not a!ect the inferences we draw from our results, we have also estimated similar models allowing for payout decreases to be a separate choice and models allowing for repurchase decreases and dividend decreases to be separate choices. The results reported below are robust to these speci"cations.
The coe$cients reported in Tables 4 and 5 are estimates of the log-odds between each pair of categories. The multivariate results tell a similar story to the multivariate results. The category of "rms that do not increase payouts are smaller and have worse operating income both before and after the potential payout increase than any of the payout-increasing categories. Higher standard deviations of operating income also predict a higher probability of not paying out cash. Within the categories of "rms that do increase payouts, higher operating incomes increase the probability of a dividend increase, while higher standard deviations of operating incomes increase the probability of repurchases. One univariate result that does not hold here concerns nonoperating income prior to the potential payout, which, in a multivariate context, is not signi"cantly related to the choice between dividends and repurchases. However, the non-operating income subsequent to the payout change is signi"-cantly positively related to the likelihood of repurchases. Finally, dividendincreasing "rms and "rms that both increase dividends and repurchases have signi"cantly higher market returns than repurchasing "rms for both prior and current years.
Finally, the results reported in Table 5 incorporate the impact of institutional ownership, similar to DeAngelo et al. (2000) . Institutional ownership is correlated with both the "rm's decision to increase payouts and the choice of payout methods. Similar to the univariate results, "rms that increase payouts have signi"cantly higher institutional ownership than "rms that do not increase payouts. In addition, dividend-increasing "rms have higher institutional ownership than repurchasing "rms.
Overall, our multivariate analysis is consistent with the univariate comparisons discussed earlier and both generally support the hypothesis that the "nancial #exibility inherent in open market repurchase programs is an important consideration in the choice of payout methods.
Conclusions
In this paper we analyze the recent rise in open market stock repurchases. We start with a complete listing of program announcements supplied by SDC. From these announcements, we construct a database consisting of both an underestimate and an overestimate of actual repurchases for every Compustat "rm Table 4 Operating and stock performance characteristics a!ecting a "rm's choice of payout method This table presents the results from estimation of a multinomial logit model of various operating characteristics and stock returns thought to predict a "rm's choice of alternative methods of distributing cash #ows in a given year. Each column provides the parameter estimates obtained from the log-odds ratios. The "rst column compares "rm-years with no increase in payouts to "rm-years in which payouts increase through the use of repurchases, increased dividends or both. The second column compares "rm-years with repurchase program initiations or expansions to the other possible outcomes. The third column compares "rm-years with both stock repurchases and dividend increases to the other alternatives and the fourth column compares "rm-years with dividend increases to the other alternatives. All independent variables are the same as de"ned in Table 3 . Log-likelihood !9,157 Table 5 Operating and stock performance characteristics a!ecting a "rm's choice of payout method
This table presents the results from estimation of a multinomial logit model of various operating characteristics and stock returns thought to predict a "rm's choice of alternative methods of distributing cash #ows in a given year. Each column provides the parameter estimates obtained from the log-odds ratios. The "rst column compares "rm-years with no increase in payouts to "rm-years in which payouts increase through the use of repurchases, increased dividends or both. The second column compares "rm-years with repurchase program initiations or expansions to the other possible outcomes. The third column compares "rm-years with both stock repurchases and dividend increases to the other alternatives and the fourth column compares "rm-years with dividend increases to the other alternatives. All independent variables are the same as de"ned in Table 3 . between 1985 and 1996. The data indicate that repurchases have grown over this period. In 1996, actual repurchases amounted to between $44.3 and $63.3 billion, suggesting that they are an economically important source of payouts. However, repurchases are still considerably smaller than the $141.7 billion in dividends paid that year. Repurchases are noticeably more volatile than dividends. They appear to vary procyclically, they were high during the rising markets of the late 1980s, dropped in the recession of the early 1990s and increased during the boom of the mid-1990s. Repurchases are responsible for a disproportionately large fraction of the variation in total payouts. The smoothness of the dividend series combined with the volatility and procyclicality of the repurchase series are consistent with the view that dividends are paid out of sustainable cash #ows while repurchases are paid out of temporary cash #ows. Repurchases do not appear to be replacing dividends; rather they seem to serve the complementary role of paying out short-term cash #ows.
A cross-sectional analysis of "rms' decisions to increase dividends or repurchases is consistent with this view. Firms with higher operating cash #ows are more likely to increase dividends, while "rms with higher non-operating cash #ows are more likely to increase repurchases. Firms with a higher standard deviation of cash #ows are more likely to use repurchases. Subsequent to the payout increase, cash #ows of repurchasing "rms continue to be lower than those of dividend-increasing "rms.
Textbook discussion of payout policy generally suggests that dividends and stock repurchases are more or less equivalent ways of paying out cash #ows (see Brealey and Myers, 1996 or Grinblatt and Titman, 1988) . Generally, the discussion of the choice between the two revolves around Black's (1976) focus on repurchases' tax advantage relative to dividends. Our empirical work suggests that much more than taxes are necessary to explain di!erences in how dividends and repurchases are used in practice. Dividends and repurchases are used at di!erent places in the business cycle by di!erent types of "rms. Our interpretation of these results emphasizes the "nancial #exibility inherent in repurchases. While this is likely to be part of the explanation, the complete answer is undoubtedly more involved. For example, the striking di!erence in stock market performance prior to dividend increases and repurchase programs suggests that valuation is also an important factor in determining payout methods.
Even though repurchases have not replaced dividends, they have become an important source of payouts. Many branches of "nance research have focused on dividends, and their yields in many di!erent contexts. For example, much research has examined the extent to which expected returns can be predicted using dividend yields (see Campbell and Shiller, 1988; Fama and French, 1988; Kandel and Stambaugh, 1996; Kothari and Shanken, 1997; or Ponti! and Schall, 1998) . Another related literature has focused on excess volatility and the issue of whether the variation in stock prices can be explained by movements in dividends (see Shiller, 1981; Leroy and Porter, 1981; Marsh and Merton, 1986; Kothari and Shanken, 1992) . These two strands of the literature could be extended productively by considering total payouts rather than only dividends in their econometric work.
